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INNOVATION VERSUS ENCRUSTATION: AGENCY COSTS IN CONTRACT
REPRODUCTION
Stephen J. Choi,* Mitu Gulati** & Robert E. Scott***
Abstract
This article studies the impact of exogenous legal change on whether and how lawyers
across four different deal types revise their contracts’ governing law clauses in order to solve the
problem that the legal change created. The governing law clause is present in practically every
contract across a wide range of industries and, in particular, it appears in deals as disparate as
private equity M&A transactions and sovereign bond issuances. Properly drafted, the clause
increases the ex ante economic value of the contract to both parties by reducing uncertainty and
litigation risk. We posit that different levels of agency costs are the motivating factors that
influence beneficial innovations in governing law clauses as well as their mirror opposite, costly
encrustations. Our data show that lawyers who draft private equity M&A deals pay more attention
to the deal terms than lawyers producing corporate and sovereign bond contracts. Because agency
costs are low in the private equity setting, we observe significantly more innovation in private
equity deals as compared to sovereign and corporate bond transactions where the agency
problems of drafting lawyers are much greater. More surprising, we also find that contracts
drafted by private equity M&A lawyers have more obsolete and encrusted terms than the contracts
of the other deal types. Our conjecture is that the lawyers' dominant drafting strategy is to find
examples of a desired term in other documents and import that language verbatim into the contract
together with other redundant and obsolete terms including, on occasion, terms that may harm the
clients' interests if retained in the contract.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, multiple studies have suggested that standard form commercial
contracts often contain unintelligible and obsolete terms.1 In addition to the ordinary risks of
obsolescence, the repetitious use of a standardized term leads to encrustation: the
intelligibility of language deteriorates significantly as legal jargon is overlaid on standard
linguistic formulations.2 Over time, the clarity and communicative quality of the boilerplate
term is undermined. Indeed, it is commonly assumed that the cut and paste boilerplate
documents of the bond lawyers who draft these contracts are rife with problems: that is what
happens when one blindly copies an aircraft receivables deal into one for ships and forgets to
change the word “airport” to “port.” This dynamic of replicating by rote the terms from prior
transactions is exacerbated when the contract terms are reproduced largely because the terms
are part of the market standard.3 Moreover, plagued by collective action problems, contracting
parties and their lawyers fail to react to judicial errors in interpreting these boilerplate terms
and are unable readily to convert the boilerplate into new and intelligible formulations.4 The
end result is that encrusted terms can persist in these boilerplate contracts unchanged for
decades providing arbitrage opportunities for market traders who identify uncertain meanings
and then exploit the uncertainties in litigation.5

1

E.g., John F. Coyle & Mark C. Weidemaier, Interpreting Contracts Without Context, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1673
(2018); Christopher C. French, Insurance Polcies: The Grandparents of Contractual Black Holes, 67 DUKE L. J. 40
(2017); Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, Boiling Down Boilerplate in M&A Agreements 67 DUKE L. J. 219
(2019); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial Boilerplate,
67 DUKE L.J. 1 (2017).
2

See Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 1; see also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice:
An Analysis of the Interaction Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 265, 288-89 (1985)
(describing the phenomena of encrustation and rote usage in contracts and their costs).
3

For discussions of this reproduction dynamic, see Julian Nyarko, Stickiness and Incomplete Contracting:
Explaining the Lack of Forum Selection Clauses in Commercial Agreements (2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/law-economics-studies/nyarko_stickiness.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HQ6F-24MD]; see also Anna Gelpern, Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Mitu Gulati, If Boilerplate Could
Talk: The Work of Standard Terms in Sovereign Bond Contracts, 44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 617 (2019).
4

Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Variation in Boilerplate: Rational Design or Random Mutation?,
20 AM. L & ECON. REV. 1 (2017).
5

This occurred in 2016 when Argentina settled with arbitrageurs who successfully held out from a restructuring offer
after asserting a novel interpretation of the ubiquitous pari passu clause found in almost all sovereign debt contracts.
Holdouts from Argentina’s efforts to restructure its debt claimed that the pari passu clause, which provided that “ the
bonds rank and will rank pari passu in right of payment with all of the Issuer’s present and future unsubordinated

2
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At first glance, this problem may seem endemic to the production efficiencies of
standardization that are characteristic of these large, multilateral markets. The very elements of
fixed and unchanging meaning that make standardized terms attractive in bond markets are the
same elements that can contribute to the erosion of that meaning over time. Moreover,
coordination problems are more difficult to solve in large markets where the gains from revising
obsolete and encrusted terms are diffused. On this view, the problems of sticky, encrusted terms
would not be found, say, in merger and acquisition (M&A) contracts that are bilateral,
individually tailored transactions. In this latter environment, the parties can more readily
coordinate on revising terms that over time become obsolete or encrusted with jargon. One might
think of the attorneys who draft M&A contracts as artisans and the bond lawyers who issue
standard boilerplate as workers on an assembly line.6 The artisans craft bespoke contracts
whereas the assembly line workers, bound by the constraints of standardization, cut and paste
prior deals into new ones.
There is support for the view that M&A contracts are not infected with the problems of
encrusted and sticky boilerplate. Research on the evolution of M&A contracts by John Coates
suggests that the observed increase in the length of M&A contracts over the years represents
innovation rather than encrustation—the rational modification of contracts to deal with hitherto
unforeseen contingencies.7 Perhaps, then, there is a different dynamic in environments where the

external indebtedness,” was an inter-creditor agreement that entitled a creditor who was not paid its pro rata share to
an injunction against other creditors who were paid that share. Bonds worth many billions of dollars were sold with
the litigated language unchanged for years after the first challenge by the holdouts was mounted. Choi et al., Black
Holes, supra note 1 at 27.
6

We borrow this dichotomy from Barak Richman, whose 2011 article was at the forefront of urging the study of the
contract production process. See Barak D. Richman, Contracts Meet Henry Ford, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (2011);
see also Eyal Zamir, The Power of Default: Path Dependence in the Drafting of Commercial Contracts, JOTWELL
(January 8, 2020) (similar), at https://contracts.jotwell.com/the-power-of-default-path-dependence-in-the-draftingof-commercial-contracts/.
7

See John Coates, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? (2016 draft) (finding, in a study of M&A contracts, that a
significant portion of the growth of the length of the contracts over time is the product of rational responses to new
risks rather than the addition of mere verbiage), at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2862019

3
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terms are individually tailored and collective action problems are reduced, if not eliminated.8
Here, the argument goes, new language appears in these contracts as a function of innovation by
rational, sophisticated parties seeking to design their contracts more efficiently to reflect the
parties’ commercial bargain.9
This view of M&A contracting has been questioned, however, by both academics and
practitioners. Robert Anderson and Jeffrey Manns studied the evolutionary patterns showing how
language from one contract migrates to another and found evidence of significant inefficiencies
in the ways M&A contracts evolve.10 Glenn West, one of the founders of Weil Gotshal’s private
equity practice, suggested that even the finely tailored private equity contracts crafted by M&A
attorneys might be infected with encrusted terms. West claimed that frequently there is language
in M&A contracts that (perhaps) once served a real purpose, but no longer does, and yet gets
ritualistically repeated deal after deal.11
We had observed this same phenomenon of inefficient, encrusted terms in our study of
the evolution of the pari passu clause in sovereign bonds.12 Drawing on our prior work and these
other observations from West, Anderson and Manns, we conjectured that the evidence of

8

We also found some evidence of this phenomenon in a prior article comparing innovation rates in private equity
M&A deals versus corporate bonds. The former was higher. See Robert E. Scott, Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati,
Revising Boilerplate: A Comparison of Private and Public Company Transactions, __ WISC. L. REV. __ (2020).
9

E.g., John Coates, Darius Palia & Ge Wu, Are M&A Contracts Value Relevant to Bidder and Target Shareholder?
(2019 draft) (finding M&A contracting practices to be more consistent with the expert lawyering hypothesis than
boilerplate reproduction), at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3201235.
10

See Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient Evolution of Merger Agreements, 85 GEO.WASH. L. REV.
57 (2017); Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, Engineering Greater Efficiency in Mergers and Acquisitions, 72 BUS.
LAWYER 657 (2017); Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, Boiling Down Boilerplate in M&A Contracts, 67 DUKE L.
J. 219 (2019) (suggesting a high degree of encrustation and rote usage in M&A contracts); Robert Anderson, Path
Dependance, Information and Contracting in Business Law and Economics,__ WISC. L. REV. __ (2020).
11

The delightful title of Glenn West’s lecture at the 14th Annual Mergers and Acquisitions Institute on October 5,
2018 was: Have Sea Squirts Invaded Your Contract?—Avoiding the Mindless Use of So-Called “ Market” Terms
You May or May Not Understand“ , at https://www.weil.com/global-search/glenn-west/speaking-engagements ; see
also Glenn D. West, Do You Really Know What Consequential Damages Means? Weil Private Equity Blog (May
18, 2020) (describing the sea squirt phenomenon in contracts), at https://privateequity.weil.com/features/do-youreally-know-what-consequential-damages-means/
12

Choi et al., Black Holes, supra note 1.

4
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encrustation was a function of both the costs of coordination in large markets and the presence of
agency costs among the contracting parties and their lawyers.13 Our study of how agency costs
impeded revisions to the pari passu clause in sovereign bonds was arguably unusual, however,
even in comparison to other sovereign debt provisions. Pari passu was a remnant of the era of
gunboat diplomacy of the late 1800s, a vestigial term that made no sense in the modern context.14
The clause remained in the contract only because it had always been there. But that is not the
case with most other provisions in sovereign debt contracts. They do perform some function.
West was suggesting, however, that encrustations appear even in bilateral M&A transactions and
in the most basic of clauses in a commercial contract such as the ubiquitous governing law
provision.15
The governing law clause thus presents an opportunity to test the agency cost hypothesis
in an environment where the coordination problems stemming from large market standardization
are not present. The governing law clause is present in practically every contract across a wide
range of industries and, in particular, it appears in both M&A deals and sovereign bond
issuances. Properly drafted, the clause increases the ex ante economic value of the contract to
both parties by reducing uncertainty and litigation risk. We posit, therefore, that different levels
13

The agency cost problem in sovereign bond issuances implicates two sets of agents. The parties driving the deal
on both sides of the transaction -- government officials on the client side and investment bankers on the investor side
-- have short-term incentives to get the deals done at the cheapest front-end costs and are not concerned about
encrusted boilerplate terms that are only relevant in the low probability event of default. These “ client-side” and “
investor-side” agents are unlikely to be present when a default occurs. In addition, there are the elite lawyers who
negotiate and draft the contracts for the issuers and investors. Their incentives are to process bond issues at the least
ex ante cost and as quickly as possible. This single-minded focus on reducing front-end contracting costs is simply a
reflection of the fact that the “ legal terms” for which the lawyers are responsible and that form the standard
boilerplate are seen as immaterial to both sellers and buyers in the initial pricing of the bond. Scott et al., supra note
8.
14

MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE 3 ½ MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT
DESIGN (2013).
15

West called them “ sea quirts” , a type of brainless barnacle. Roughly a decade earlier, legendary UK contract and
international finance lawyer, Philip Wood, also used the metaphor of barnacles accumulating on a ship’s hull to
describe the phenomenon of contractual encrustations. See Philip Wood, Life After Lehman: Changes in Market
Practice (Allen & Overy Publications, 2009), at 9. Key to appreciating the metaphor in the contractual context,
Wood explained to one of us some years ago, was the fact that barnacles on ship’s hull can be an enormous source
of inefficiency for the ship, but, over time, become extremely hard to remove. See Office of Naval Research,
Barnacle Busting: Research Targets Ship Biofouling, PHYS.ORG (Oct. 13, 2016) (“ Individually, tiny barnacles pose
little threat to hulking U.S. Navy ships. But when clustered in thick clumps on a vessel’s hull—a natural occurrence
called biofouling—these sticky crustaceans can slow the ship and increase its fuel consumption by 40 percent.” ) at
https://phys.org/news/2016-10-barnacle-ship-biofouling.html

5

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3653463

Draft Date: July 18, 2020

of agency costs are the motivating factors that influence the presence in governing law clauses of
costly encrustations and its mirror opposite, beneficial innovations.
Prior research on the topic of contract evolution has focused largely on the dynamics of
contract innovation—how, when, and how fast do contracts evolve to respond to changes in
states of the world that call for contractual reform. Little attention has been paid to the process
by which legal jargon and other verbiage accumulates and when and how to remove costly
redundancy. It is this dynamic of encrustation that is a primary focus of this paper. The standard
assumption, accepted by legal and economic scholars alike as well as by courts, is that the words
in contracts are there because the parties choose them deliberately to communicate their
intentions at the time of contracting. It follows, therefore, that words in the contract should be
interpreted as if they were intended to have a particular, identifiable meaning.
The possibility that words in contract clauses might instead be the product of the
inadvertent accumulation of obsolete or redundant words and phrases is inconsistent with the
standard maxim of interpretation that courts should, where possible, give all the words in a
contract a distinctive meaning. This maxim is based on the implicit assumption that the contract
terms are drafted by parties to communicate a particular intent. To be sure, contemporary courts
recognize that some contracts may contain language whose meaning is vague or ambiguous and
where extrinsic evidence is necessary to determine the parties’ intentions. But even that
assumption does not hold when the transaction is a bespoke M&A contract between two
sophisticated parties. There, especially in the commercially sophisticated jurisdictions, courts
strive to interpret every term by examining just the words in the contract and assume that
variations in the formulation of standard terms implies differences in their meaning.16 These
basic maxims of interpretation stand in contrast with the fact that the production process for the
vast majority of commercial contracts involves marginal modifications to boilerplate templates
that were not specifically tailored to the deal in question. Thus, the classic assumptions of
contract interpretation are in tension with the evidence of how contemporary contract terms are
produced.

16

See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Complete Contracts in Finance, __WISC. L. REV. 531, 541 (2020).

6
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The lawyers who draft contracts are typically agents rather than principals. Other things
equal, agents tend to exert efforts to do more of what the principal requires when the principal is
more focused on monitoring the agent. In the sovereign debt context, we conjectured that
lawyers were remarkably slow to remedy even the most obvious problems in their contract
clauses in part because the parties monitoring the lawyers were themselves agents. And, more
importantly, those secondary agents (government officials and investment bankers) had shortterm incentives to get the transactions done with minimal alteration of the deal templates that had
worked before. The true principals, the people of the country on one side and the bond investors
on the other side, were not even present at the deal-making stage. This double agency cost in the
sovereign bond context led to only episodic changes in the documents and when changes did
occur they were meaningless encrustations. Not until a series of court cases that shocked the
market on the meaning of the pari passu clause did the entire industry finally coordinate on a
move to a wholesale change in the clause.
As a matter of theory, then, we should expect to see a different encrustation/innovation
dynamic in bilateral settings where the contracts are more likely to be individually tailored than
in multilateral markets where standardized contracts are the norm. This dynamic should be
particularly applicable to the drafting of M&A contracts. Put differently, in settings where
agency problems are smaller and coordination difficulties are reduced (e.g., M&A deals with
concentrated private equity investors) we should observe more rapid changes to contract terms as
opposed to settings where agency costs are larger and coordination is more challenging (routine
bond issuances where investors are dispersed and often not present at the contract production
stage). The rationale is that the principals in the M&A/private equity market have more at stake
and are directly involved in the deals.17 As a result, their lawyer-agents pay more attention to the
deal terms. Thus, we expect most of the changes in the M&A context to be economically

Within the field of M&A contracting itself, there is a debate over the extent to which contract language is primarily
the product of expert lawyering or blind verbatim copying. On the one hand, see John Coates, Darius Palia & Ge Wu,
Are M&A Contracts Value Relevant to Bidder and Target Shareholders? (June 2019) (unpublished manuscript)
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3201235) [https://perma.cc/XQ7U-T8SF]. On the other, see the
articles by Anderson & Manns, supra note 10.
17

7
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beneficial innovations. After all, the parties are sophisticated and their lawyers are motivated to
tailor contracts so as to maximize the surplus value of the contract for their clients.
What remains uncertain is whether the active attention to contract drafting in the M&A
context means fewer encrustations. Under an ideal model of efficient drafting, where a lawyer
revises a contract by hand to state precisely what is meant, more attention to drafting should
mean fewer encrustations. Indeed, under this model, there should be no encrustations since
revisions will remove vestigial language that erodes meaning. On the other hand, imagine a
model of contract drafting where the process relies heavily on verbatim copying of terms found
in other contracts. Under this model, linguistic accuracy is traded off against production
efficiency. Here, a lawyer who is motivated by her principal to revise a contract carefully to
solve a known contracting problem is also likely to add more encrustations, even if she succeeds
in solving the problem. By importing terms verbatim from other contracts in order to solve the
problem at issue, the lawyer using this drafting strategy is also likely as well to import
meaningless jargon.18 Put differently, the greater rate of change for M&A contracts may
introduce a spillover effect, increasing opportunities for unrelated encrustations to appear
randomly.
In this study, we set up a horse race across four different deal types over the 2010-2020
time period. Our primary comparison is between private equity M&A, a low agency cost setting,
and sovereign bond deals, a high agency cost setting. To those deal types, we add two other sets
of contracts—investment grade corporate bonds and sub-investment grade corporate bonds—that
we expect to exhibit levels of agency cost between sovereign and private equity M&A deals.
Agency costs are arguably lower in corporate bond issues than in the sovereign bond context: the
corporate managers, while still agents of dispersed principals, have more at stake personally than
the government officials in a sovereign bond deal. However, we expect higher agency costs with
corporate bonds issued to dispersed investors than with bilateral, private equity/M&A deals.

18

To borrow from Rob Anderson and Jeff Mann’s research on contract evolution, we are likely to see both “ drift”
and “design”. See Anderson & Mann, supra note 10.

8
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In all four of the deal types, there are governing law clauses in the contracts we examine.
Importantly, the clause performs the same function in each of the deal types and is impacted by
developments in the case law in roughly the same fashion. For example, if a Ninth Circuit case
involving automobile franchises in Hawaii interprets the word “construed” in a governing law
clause to have a unique and different meaning from what lawyers believed the clause meant, this
new interpretation should motivate a modification of the standard language for the governing law
clause in both the bond and the M&A contexts. Specifically, the new interpretation should force
a choice regarding innovation or encrustation. The lawyers may choose to retain the problematic
language to be repeated in the next deal (encrustation), or they may choose to revise the clause
and delay closing the deal while a new formulation of the clause is negotiated (innovation).
Our data covers the period 2010 to 2020 and we use a core set of cases and practitioner
commentaries that called for a specific revision to the standard governing law clauses during the
period of our data as the exogenous events or, collectively, the “legal shock” that should
motivate drafting attorneys to revise their governing law clauses. This legal shock enables us to
compare responses across the four different deal types for which we collected data. Importantly,
the shock should motivate parties to innovate by adding specific terminology that would increase
the ex ante value of the governing law clause. A secondary dynamic can also occur if the
drafters' response to the shock is to copy language verbatim from other contracts or some
standard industry template. In the verbatim copying model of drafting, there is the possibility of
spillovers where the contract terms that are more responsive to external shocks also accumulate
encrustations. In what follows, therefore, we examine both differences in the rates of innovation
across different contract settings as well as differences in the growth of encrusted debris.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part II we review a recent set of exogenous events
that in theory should have motivated an innovative revision in governing law clauses across all
of our settings. This Part also collects evidence from the literature of the many encrustations in
governing law clauses that have accumulated over time. Part III uses a hand coded dataset to test
the hypothesis that the agency problems of drafting lawyers are a prime explanator of the
persistence of sticky and encrusted terms in commercial contracts. We find evidence that the
governing law clauses in private equity deals where agency costs are lower have both more
9
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innovative terms as well as more encrusted terms as compared with the other deal types. In
private equity deals, the legal shock that should motivate lawyers to draft an addition to the
clause corresponds to a greater rate of innovation but the legal shock also corresponds to a
greater rate of encrustation. Parts IV and V provide additional confirmation that lower agency
costs lead to greater contract drafting activity for private equity deals, but that this greater level
of activity correlates also with an increase in encrustations.19 Part VI concludes.
II.

INNOVATIONS AND ENCRUSTATIONS

The standard ex ante understanding of the purpose of a governing law clause in any
contract is to reduce contracting costs by providing both parties predictability and certainty as to
the applicable law and interpretive styles that will govern in the event of litigation.20 The
transactional lawyer presumably selects a jurisdiction with a coherent body of precedent and
with courts that understand commercial practice. In particular, sophisticated commercial parties
want courts to respect the parties’ shared intent to maximize the expected joint value of their
agreements at the time they are made; that is, to give parties the deal for which they negotiated.21

19

One might think of private equity M&A contract drafting as similar to a teenager beginning to drive. He drives
fast and gets to his destination quickly, but he also hits a lot of inanimate objects along the way and accumulates
dents.
20

This is also the view in the academic literature on the governing law clause. E.g., Yannis Manuelides, English
Law and Jurisdiction Post Brexit, in THE CHANGING GEOGRAPHY OF FINANCE AND REGULATION POST BREXIT
(Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti, Joanna Gray & Mitu Gulati eds. 2017) (discussing the reasons why English law is so
often chosen to govern commercial transactions); See also Geoffrey Miller & Ted Eisenberg, The Flight to New
York: An Empirical Study of the Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly Held Companies’
Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1474 (2008-09); Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual
Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363, 366, 403 (2003).
21

The interpretive goal in contract cases is to recover and then enforce the parties’ apparent intentions, as they
existed at the time of contract. Intention is determined objectively and prospectively: A party is taken to mean what
a contract partner could plausibly believe it meant when the parties contracted. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 568–70 (2003). This goal is implemented
differently, however, depending on the jurisdiction that governs the contract. Many (indeed most) states follow a
traditional common law, “ textualist” approach to interpretation. Here, when the writing is clear, courts are disabled
from inquiring into the context surrounding the contract. In contrast, in states that follow California, and in all states
where the subject matter involves the sale of goods under the UCC, the courts are “ contextualist.” Here, courts are
invited to consider the context regardless of the clarity of the written contract. Thus, the choice of governance
clauses implicates a further choice: text or context? For discussion, see Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel &
Robert E, Scott, Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23 (2014);

10

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3653463

Draft Date: July 18, 2020

All of that is to say that the governing law clause is crucially important in any dispute
that goes to litigation, because it sets out the rules of the game. Yet, it is the rare transactional
lawyer who has much interest in the body of substantive law that determines the legal meanings
of the different formulations of a governing law clause. Those differences are governed by
conflict-of-laws; a field that, while a key part of any law school curriculum a half century ago, is
today often viewed as arcane, complex and of little utility to the practicing lawyer.22 While
transactional lawyers care about which state’s law is selected in the governing law clause, they
tend not to pay much attention to the many variations of the clause; let alone try to negotiate over
them.23
For our purposes, the foregoing features make the governing law clause a good vehicle to
study the related phenomena of innovation and encrustation. Because this is a clause that does
not address the basic economics of the deal, transactional lawyers will be inclined to give the
clause minimal attention—other than to ensure that a widely accepted form of the clause is in the
deal contract. It also means that transactional lawyers are unlikely to read the case law that
implicates these conflicts issues. John Coyle, the leading expert on governing law clauses,
explains why the drafting of these clauses rarely receives adequate attention:
First, most lawyers lack the time to read hundreds of published cases about choice-of-law
clauses to identify drafting pitfalls. These lawyers are busy and their clients don’t want
to pay for them to undertake this research and so the lawyers (rationally) choose not to
undertake it.
Second, most lawyers don’t really understand conflict of laws. It’s a famously
complicated body of law and is a class that very few people take in law school. Without a
sound doctrinal grounding in conflicts, most lawyers lack the ability to appreciate the
significance of small wording changes in a choice-of-law clause.
Third, the choice-of-law clause only really matters when the contract winds up in
litigation and the contract touches on more than one jurisdiction and the law is different
22

For discussions of the state of the conflicts-of-law field in the U.S., see Ralf Michaels, After the Revolution:
Decline and Rise of U.S. Conflict of Laws, 11 YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE INT’L L. 1 (2009); Laura E. Little, Conflict of
Laws Structure and Vision: Updating a Venerable Discipline, 31 GEORGIA ST. U. L. REV. 231 (2015); Annelise
Riles, Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 47 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 63, 66 (2014).
23

See John F. Coyle, Choice of Law Clauses in U.S. Bond Indentures, 13 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 152, 157 (2018) (“Since
both the issuers and the underwriters generally view the ancillary language in the choice- of-law clause as
unimportant, this language is virtually never discussed or negotiated.” ).

11
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across the two jurisdictions. Since this constellation of factors is rare, most lawyers
rationally devote little time to the intricacies of how to draft choice-of-law clauses.24
In what follows, we describe a set of recent events that led to litigation and that provide
the basis for our empirical analysis. These case law developments produced uncertainty over the
effect of a specific linguistic variation in governing law clauses. We posit that this case law
should motivate transactional lawyers who are faithful agents to modify the governing law clause
in order to remove the resulting uncertainty. We also analyze common encrustations identified in
the literature on governing law clauses that are not directly subject to the legal events we
identify.
A.

Legal Change and Innovations
“This agreement is governed by the laws of [state X]” is the simplest form of the

governing law clause in a commercial contract. Only a handful of the contracts in our database
use this basic nine-word version of the clause, even though the language does most of the work
that one would require when drafting a governing law clause. Instead, the average length of the
clause in our dataset is 168 words, over 18 times the length of the basic clause.25 And most of
those extra words are redundant or obsolete verbiage, what we have designated as encrustations.
Yet some of these variations in governing law clauses do create ex ante contractual value
by reducing uncertainty and litigation risk. We identify multiple events that occurred during the

24

Email from John F. Coyle, July 12, 2020 (on file with authors).

25

As we discuss more fully below, we compute the length of the governing law clause in a particular deal omitting
words referring to the agreement itself such as “ This agreement” (referred to as the “ trimmed” clause). Sometimes
the language identifying the transaction or documents to which the governing law clause applies is longer, such as “
The Fiscal and Paying Agency Agreement, the Notes and the Guarantee.” Omitting the words referencing the
security or documents in the transaction reduces variations in the clause length not due to variations in the operation
of the governing law clause but instead due to variations in the number of securities or documents in the transaction.
The comparison between the nine-word basic version of the governing law clause and the mean length for the
trimmed clause in our dataset therefore understates how much longer the average clause is compared with the basic
version.
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time of our study that increased the economic benefit the governing law clause containing one
particular variation that we designate as the “non-contractual term.” 26
Legal Change and the Non-Contractual Term
Unlike the simple version of the clause quoted above, a minority of governing law
clauses in our dataset begin with the following: “This Agreement, the rights of the parties
hereunder and all Actions arising in whole or in part under or in connection herewith, will be
governed by….” The “non-contractual term” encompasses phrases that expand the application
of the governing law clause to “Actions arising . . . or in connection herewith” or its equivalents
“all noncontractual matters arising out of” or “tort and statutory matters arising out of” or any
other similar phrases.27 The legal changes that we describe below measurably increased the value
of governing law clauses that contained such a non-contractual term.
In 2017, in Reid v. Siniscalchi, the Delaware Chancery Court warned that the typical
governing law clause that is silent on non-contractual matters risks the court interpreting the
clause not to apply to non-contractual matters such as a claim that there was fraud in the
inducement of the contract (if brought as a tort claim). For parties seeking to have all matters
relating to their contractual relationship governed by the law of a particular jurisdiction, the Reid

26

Another possible innovation related to the governing law clause involves the use of a clause that specifies whether
the statute of limitations of the jurisdiction chosen in the governing law clause applies. An example is the following:
“The Agreement is governed by the law of the State of New Jersey, including its statute of limitations.” The
suggestion that this version of the governing law clause be used appeared in a blog post by Glenn West in 2016,
following a 2015 Delaware case, Pivotal Payments Direct Corp. v. Planet Payment, Inc., that held that choice-oflaw provisions in contracts do not apply to statutes of limitations unless the choice-of-law provision expressly
provides this. See Glenn D. West, Contractual Choice of Governing Law and Statutes of Limitations—The Law You
Choose to Govern Your Contract May Not Be the Law That Governs the Applicable Statute of Limitations for
Claims Arising Under or Related to That Contract, WEIL INSIGHTS, WEIL’S GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY WATCH (Jan.
12, 2016), http://goo.gl/RlJTDv. Although we do not analyze this innovation in detail in this paper, our preliminary
examination found there to be a small magnitude increase (from 0% to 12%) in the use of this innovation near the
end of our dataset time period from 2016 to 2020 in private equity deals (and no increase in the corporate and
sovereign bonds). As Glenn West explained it to us, the need for this innovation was perhaps not as urgent in many
cases as the “non contractual” one that we do analyze since a well drafted forum selection clause fixes the issue at
hand. See Email from Glenn D. West (July 17, 2020) (on file with authors).
27

This matter, including variations in the clause, is discussed in Glenn D. West, Contract Drafting 101: A Checklist
Derived From Recent Caselaw, State Bar of Texas In-House Counsel Course (July 2016), at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2805481.
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court explained, the parties needed to specify that non-contractual matters relating to the
agreement were also under the contractually specified governing law.28
In 2009, almost a decade prior to the Reid case, articles by prominent lawyers, Glenn
West and Benton Lewis, partners at Weil Gotshal and Mitchell Geller, a partner at Holland and
Knight, made much the same point in widely circulated practitioner journals.29 They cautioned
drafting attorneys to specify explicitly in the governing law clause that non-contractual disputes
arising out of, or relating to, the agreement at hand were to be governed by the same law as that
of the contract. From prior work we know that legal cases themselves rarely produce changes to
boilerplate languge. What is key is for practitioners to coordinate on the desired change.30 The
articles by prominent lawyers, in two of the most widely circulated practitioner journals – the
Business Lawyer and the New York Law Journal – was such an instance. The admonition was
then emphasized in another leading practitioner journal, the Corporate Counsel, in 2013, by Eric
Fishman and Amanda Freyre, senior practitioners from the Pillsbury law firm. By 2013, then,
we think there was accumulation of opinion in the elite bar, clearly communicated to all drafting
attorneys, that a change was required, thus forming a focal point around which attorneys could
coordinate on the appropriarte revision.
Subsequently, there were furrther interventions in 2016 and 2017 in blog posts by Weil
Gotshal’s Glenn West, by law review articles by John Coyle in 2017 and 2018, and a blog post
by two Kirkland & Ellis partners, Daniel Wolf and Stefan Atkinson in 2019.31 We assume that
28

The Delaware courts have been squirrely on this. In 2016, the Delaware Supreme Court implied that it would
presume that a generic choice-of-law clause that did not contain the “ in connection with” or “ related to” language
would still be construed broadly to cover tort claims. Hazout v. Tsang Mun Ting, 134 A.3d 274, 293 n.68 (Del.
2016). The court expressly stated, however, that it was not rendering a decision on this issue in the case at hand.
The need for clarity in language then gets re-emphasized in a 2019 Chancery court decision, Sheldon v. Pinto (No.
2017-0838-MTZ) https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=284490
29

See Glenn D. West & Benton Lewis, Contracting to Avoid Extra-Contractual Liability – Can Your Contractual
Deal Ever Really be the “ Entire” Deal? 64 BUS. LAWYER 999 (2009); Mitchell J. Geller, Ensuring Choice-of-Law
Provision Includes Non-Contractual Claims, N.Y. L.J. at 1 (July 7, 2009) (expressing disbelief that “ corporate
attorneys continue to rely on ‘standard’ language used in prior agreements that do not contain [expansive choice-oflaw clauses]” ).
30

Choi et al., Black Holes, supra note 1.

31

See John F. Coyle & W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Interpreting Without Context, 67 AMER. U. L. REV. 1673 (2018);
The Canons of Construction for Choice-of-Law Clauses, 92 WASH L. REV. 631 (2017) ; Coyle, Bonds, supra note
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the critical signal for change (our “legal shock”) occurred in 2013,32 but we do not discount the
possibility that the Reid case and the additional exhortations in blog posts and academic articles
in 2017, 2018 and 2019 may have added further pressure for change on the margins.
In what follows, we examine whether this pressure for change resulted in an innovation
in the explicit inclusion of a non-contractual term in the governing law clause for our four deal
types.33
One might surmise that jurisdictional variation in the caselaw could differentially affect
parties’ motivation to modify the clause to incorporate non-contractual litigation. This might

23; Eric Fishman & Amanda Freyre, Drafting a Better Choice of Law Clause, CORPORATE COUNSEL (April 19,
2013) at https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/the-sanity-clause-drafting-a-better-choice-of-lawclause.html; Glenn D. West, The Law You Choose to Govern Your Contract May Not be the Law that Governs,
WEIL PRIVATE EQUITY BLOG (Jan 12., 2016) https://privateequity.weil.com/insights/contractual-choice-ofgoverning-law-and-statutes-of-limitations-the-law-you-choose-to-govern-your-contract-may-not-be-the-law-thatgoverns-the-applicable-statute-of-limitations-for-claims-aris/ ; Glenn D. West, Making Sure Your “ Choice of Law”
Clause Chooses All of the Law of the Chosen Jurisdiction, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Sept. 18, 2017), at
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/18/making-sure-your-choice-of-law-clause-chooses-all-of-the-laws-of-thechosen-jurisdiction/ ; Daniel E. Wolf & Stefan Atkinson, Choose Wisely – Drafting Governing Law and Forum
Selection Clauses, KIRKLAND M&A UPDATE (April 8, 2019), at https://www.kirkland.com/publications/kirklandmanda-update/2019/04/choose-wisely-drafting-governing-law.
32

See materials cited in notes 28 and 31, supra.

33

The West and Lewis 2009 Business Lawyer article was not the first mention of the need for lawyers to draft their
choice of law clauses broadly. Instead, it drew from a body of already existing case law and was in response to the
fact that West and Lewis were frustrated with the failure of practitioners to fix their governing law clauses in
response to those prior cases. The cases went back to at least the late 1970s, when courts had suggested that parties
who wanted non-contractual matters relating to their contract to be covered by the governing law clause needed to
say that precisely. See John F. Coyle, A Short History of the Choice-of-Law Clause, 91 COLO. L. REV. 1147, Section
II(D) (2020) (citing and describing the cases). Writing about one of these prior cases, Krock v. Lipsay, 97 F.3d 640,
645 (2d Cir. 1996), Glenn West, in a 2017 blog post, explained:
The standard-variety choice-of-law clause tends not to be “ sufficiently broad” and therefore does not
expressly include tort claims within its ambit. Indeed, the standard-variety choice-of-law clause tends to be
a fairly simplistic provision that reads (similar to the clause at issue in the Krock case) as follows: “ This
Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the law of the State of [ ].”
Glenn D. West, Making Sure Your “ Choice of Law” Clause Chooses All of the Law of the Chosen Jurisdiction,
Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (Sept. 18, 2017), at
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/18/making-sure-your-choice-of-law-clause-chooses-all-of-the-laws-of-thechosen-jurisdiction/ . Given the foregoing, one might have expected that lawyers would have begun revising their
clauses well before 2010 (the start of our data). But research by John Coyle tells us that there was little revision on
governing law clauses through the 1980s and 1990s. Coyle, Short History, supra note 33 at II(D) (Figure 5).
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have been a concern had the two jurisdictions that dominate our dataset, New York and
Delaware, taken distinct and different approaches to the issue. However, the uniform warning
sent by all of the practitioner and academic articles urging lawyers to reform their clauses was
that lawyers in all jurisdictions would be well advised to revise their clauses given the lack of
clarity in the background law.34
B.

Redundant and Obsolete Encrustations
In addition to the variations from the standard governing law clause that are associated

with an identifiable legal change, we also coded for every variation from the standard
formulation that appeared in at least [five percent] of one of the four datasets. Unlike the events
that motivated the inclusion of the non-contractual term, we do not have either the multiple
judicial decisions or the multiple articles by prominent practitioners advising parties to eliminate
these variations even though they all erode the clarity and communicative properties of the basic
clause. Here, there are no significant exogenous events that might independently motivate parties
to revise their clause to eliminate these encrustations. Nevertheless, coding for these superfluous
and obsolete phrases amplifies the observed differences in encrustation/innovation rates across
the four categories of contracts in our dataset and adds nuance to our story.
1. Construed
It is common for governing law clauses to embellish the basic “governed by the law of
[state X]” formulation by substituting “governed and construed by the law of [state X].” John
Coyle, the leading authority on the history of governing law clauses, explains, however, that
there is neither any evidence in the caselaw nor any logical grounds to believe that the addition
of the word “construed” would alter a court's subsequent interpretation in any respect.35

34

See Fishman & Freyre, supra note 31; see also materials cited in note 18, supra.

35

See John F. Coyle, A Short History of the Choice-of-Law Clause, 91 COLO. L. REV. 1147 (2020).
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The first version of the governing law clause that Coyle’s historical analysis identifies
from the 1860s uses only the words “construed by the law of [state X]” to refer to how the court
is supposed to analyze the contract provision in question.36 But by the 1970s, court decisions had
made it clear that the use of the word “governed by the law of [state X]” was much broader than
“construed:” the former selected all of the contract law of the state, while the latter could be read
to select just that state's rules of contract construction.37 In other words, for at least a half-century
it has been clear that there was no benefit to using the word “construed,” if one was already
using “governed.”38 If anything, “construed” is narrower in meaning than "governed:" The
additional word is an encrustation and its effect is to reduce the clarity and intelligibility of the
basic clause.
2. Interpreted
Another common variation of the basic governing law formulation is the insertion of the
additional word “interpreted.” One variation reads: “the agreement shall be governed by and
interpreted in accordance with the laws of [state X].” Sometimes, the word “interpreted” is
combined with the word “construed” as in this example: “the agreement shall be governed,
construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of [state X].”
As with the word “construed,” the word “interpreted” has been used in governing law
clauses as far back as the late 19th century. Indeed, there was even a debate over whether it was
preferable for the drafter to use “interpreted” or “construed" since arguably the two words
imagine courts engaging in slightly different tasks.39 Construction, one might surmise, is about
envisioning the contract as a whole whereas interpretation is about determining the meaning of
disputed language. Two facts are relevant for our purposes, however: first, by the late nineteenth

36

Id. at Section II.

37

Coyle explains that while most courts will interpret “ governed by” and “ construed under” in the same broad
fashion, some courts have interpreted the latter more narrowly. Id. at II(C), n.152 and accompanying text.
38

Id. at Section II(B).

39

See, e.g., WILLIAM F. ELLIOTT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 774 (1913).
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century, it was clear that courts were treating the two words as synonyms; and, second, by the
1970s, the case law was clear that the word “governed” superseded both words. Thus, parties
received no additional deference from forum courts to the chosen state's law by providing “the
agreement shall be governed, construed and interpreted under the laws of [state X]”40 The word
“interpreted,” as used in the typical governing law clause, is an encrustation.
3. Except For Conflict of Laws
A frequently used phrase in the governing law clause addresses the conflict of laws rules
of the state whose laws the parties want to govern. This phrase explicitly calls for the application
of the law of a given state excluding the conflict of laws rules of that state. For example, lawyers
drafting governing law provisions often include, after the core language, “This Agreement shall
be governed under the laws of New York,” the additional phrase, “excluding the conflict of laws
rules and principles of New York.”
This additional language excluding the conflicts rules is an encrustation. In a 2012 case,
IRB-Brasil Resseguros, S.A. v. Inepar Investments, S.A., the New York Court of Appeals
explained that the additional conflict of laws language was unnecessary because the court
understood the parties intentions without their having to use the additional redundancy.41
The conflict of laws language dealt with a risk that might have existed over three-quarters
of a century ago. In 1947, the Sixth Circuit in Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp.,
interpreted the choice of a jurisdiction’s law to include a choice of that jurisdiction’s conflicts

40

Coyle, Short History, supra note 33 at Section II(B & C); DWIGHT ARVEN JONES, CONSTRUCTION OR
INTERPRETATION OF COMMERCIAL AND TRADE CONTRACTS 3 (1886).
41

982 N.E.2d 609 (N.Y. Ct. of Appeal 2012); See also Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Bd. v Snow, 2015 NY Slip
Op 09186, also at https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2015/131.html ;John F. Coyle, Choice of
Law Clauses in U.S. Bond Indentures, 13 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 152, 157 (2018) (discussing the holdings in
IRB/Ministers); Antonia Stolper et al., Common Sense Trumps Extra Words in Governing Law Clause,
https://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2013/01/Common-Sense-Trumps-ExtraWords-in-Governing-Law__/Files/View-full-memo-Common-Sense-Trumps-Extra-Wordsi__/FileAttachment/CommonSenseTrumpsExtraWordsinGoverningLawClauseC__.pdf _

18

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3653463

Draft Date: July 18, 2020

rules, which actually stipulated that the law of another jurisdiction would apply.42 Duskin,
however, was an isolated case, as dozens of subsequent decisions have made clear. The dominant
canon of construction since 1947 is that courts will read a choice of law provision to select all of
the jurisdiction’s internal laws and not those conflicts rules that look to some other jurisdiction’s
law.43 If parties want more or less, they have to say so.
The Second Restatement of Conflicts endorsed this view over fifty years ago, stating
explicitly that the basic governing law clause was a choice of the chosen state’s internal law:
When they choose the state which is to furnish the law governing the validity of their
contract, the parties almost certainly have the [internal law] rather than the [whole law] of
that state in mind.44 To apply the [whole law] of the chosen state would introduce the
uncertainties of choice of law into the proceedings and would serve to defeat the basic
objectives, namely those of certainty and predictability, which the choice-of-law
provision was designed to achieve.45
To reiterate then, the language excluding the jurisdiction’s conflicts of law rules and
principles is an encrustation. The additional words have not added value for at least a half
century. The conflicts of law language does not appear to present any danger to the party who

42

John F. Coyle, The Canons of Construction for Choice-of-Law Clauses, 92 Wash L. Rev. 631, 642-47 (2017)
(discussing the distinction between internal law and whole law).
43

Id.

44

“ Whole law” is a term of art in the conflicts literature that refers to all of the state’s law – internal and conflicts
based. Id. at 643.
45

The Second Restatement of Conflicts was finalized in 1969 (and circulated), but was officially published in 1971.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(3); id. at cmt. h. Ironically, it is the clarification provided
by the Second Restatement that this extra wording was no longer necessary that seems to have resulted in its initial
popularity. According to John Coyle’s research, the 1947 Sixth Circuit case resulted in no governing law clauses
containing exclusions for “ conflicts of laws rules or principles” or specifying that the governing law intended to
use only the state’s “ internal” law, until 1970. That is, only after the Restatement said that this caveat to the basic
clause was not needed. See Coyle, A Short History, supra note 33 at II(E).

19

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3653463

Draft Date: July 18, 2020

uses it, but the encrustation lengthens the governing law clause, making the clause as a whole
more confusing and difficult to understand.46
4. Except for Choice of Law
Governing law clauses will sometimes contain not only an exclusion of the jurisdiction’s
conflict of laws rules, but also a purported exclusion of the jurisdiction’s choice of law rules.
We have previously discussed the potential costs of adding the phrase “except for [state X’s]
conflict of law rules.” Some drafting lawyers further encumber the governing law clause by
providing “except for [ state X’s] conflicts of law or choice of law rules.” The additional words
add absolutely nothing of substantive meaning since they are essentially synonymous. After all,
the choice of law occurs within the structure of a conflict where a choice needs to be made. This
redundancy creates unnecessary and costly uncertainty; a rational interpreter will strive to
develop a nuanced meaning that differs from the single reference to "conflicts of laws” based on
the reasonable assumption that the additional words were included in order to signal a different
intention. This encrustation weakens the communicative properties of the standard governing law
clause, reducing its reliability as an indication of what the parties really intend..
5. Internal/Domestic
Another variation on the “excluding conflict of laws” encrustation provides that the
contract is governed by the “internal” or “domestic” law of the chosen state. As explained above,
there is no reason to include this additional verbiage. By stating that the contract is “governed by
the law of [state X]” the court understands that it is to apply the internal or domestic laws of the
state (and equally understands that the parties do not want a foreign state law to apply, unless
they so specify).

46

This is particularly so if one digs deep since these additional words produce a circularity. The conflicts of law
rules of a state, after all, are the very rules that allow parties to select their governing law clause. Read strictly, the
exclusion of the conflicts rules of the state could render the governing law clause a nullity, which presumably the
parties did not intend. See Michael Gruson, Governing Law Clauses Excluding Conflicts of Laws, 37 INT’L LAW
1023, 1030 (2003).
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The source of this “internal/domestic” qualification is found in the classic treatises on
conflicts of laws from the early twentieth century.47 In the context of describing the distinction
between jurisdictions that mandated applying their entire law (that is, domestic law plus conflicts
rules) and those that allowed parties the autonomy to choose governing law, treatises often used
the language of internal versus entire law.48 But given the default understanding that contracting
parties intend the basic “governed by the law of [state X]” clause to apply to the jurisdiction’s
internal or domestic laws, the use of the words “internal” or “domestic” are a redundancy and
thus an encrustation.
6. Substantive/Procedural
On occasion, governing law clauses will explicitly choose the “substantive” law of a
jurisdiction. “Substantive” law, however, is what contracting parties receive when they choose to
have their contract governed by the law of a particular jurisdiction using the basic form of the
governing law clause. Indeed, as noted above, there is caselaw that makes clear that the basic
form of the governing law clause directs the contract to be governed by the selected state's
substantive contract law, but not its procedural law.49 Thus, parties may not automatically
receive the chosen state's procedural rules. In short, providing that the agreement is “governed by
the law of [state X]” is the same as stating that the agreement is “governed by the substantive law
of [state X”]. The redundant word “substantive” used here is just another encrustation.50
7. Made and Performed

47

Gruson, supra note 46 at 1025 (2003). For treatments of this matter from the early part of the twentieth century,
when it appears to have been a topic of debate, see John D. Falconbridge, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws,
53 L. Q. REV. 235, (1937); Joseph M. Cormack, Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question
in Conflicts of Laws, 14 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (1941).
48
49

E.g., Elliott E. Cheatham, Internal Law Distinctions in Conflicts of Laws, 21 CORNELL L. REV. 570 (1936).
See text accompanying notes __ to __ supra.

50

Professor Little suggests that parties sometimes use the term “ substantive” as a substitute for “ internal” , stating
that the contract is “ governed by the substantive law of [state X]” instead of “ governed by the internal law of [state
X].” Little, supra note 22 at 256. Both words are encrustations that increase contracting costs by reducing
intelligibility.
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Governing law clauses sometimes include phrases such as: “This Agreement is governed
by the law of [state X] as applicable to agreements made and performed in [state X].” As John
Coyle’s history of the governing law clause explains, the language “made and performed” made
sense in governing law provisions from a century ago.51 Before parties were permitted to select
the governing law for their contracts (roughly, pre-1950s), courts would apply a multi-factor test
to determine what law should apply.52 And two of the key factors were where the contract was
made and where it was to be performed.53 Thus, parties would often specify where the contract
was made and performed to reduce the risk of judicial errors in determining the applicable law.
Since parties are now entitled to specify the governing law independent of where the
contract was made or performed, the additional language is now obsolete unless the parties elect
not to specify a governing jurisdiction in the contract (an option that was not chosen by any of
the parties in our database). Nevertheless, the “made and performed” language has managed to
survive, with the even more verbose modern formulation specifying that the contract is
“governed by the law of [state X] as applicable to agreements made and performed in [state
X].”54 On its face, the language directs the court to apply the law of the state in which the
contract was made and performed which may contradict the desire to have the contract governed
by the law of the selected state. No doubt most courts can decipher the parties intentions without
great difficulty. But undeniably, the "made and performed “phrase is another encrustation: the
lack of clarity is a cost that increases the risk of strategic claims in litigation.55
8. Validity

51

See Coyle, Short History, supra note 33 at II(A).

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

A subset of governing law clauses state that the agreement is to be governed by the law of X as applicable to
contracts either “ made, performed and executed in [state X]” or “ executed and performed in [state X]” . The
addition of the redundant word “ executed” further erodes the meaning of the clause.
55

See Gruson, supra note 46 at 1029.
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A small set of governing law clauses specify explicitly that matters of the contract’s
“validity” will be governed by the law of [state X]. The background here is that the law in most
U.S. jurisdictions is not clear on whether the choice-of-law provision of a contract covers matters
of validity – questions such as whether there was adequate consideration given, proper
manifestation of assent, authorization, and so on. Since these matters are, in a sense, pre
contractual in that they help determine whether a contract was formed in the first place, some
courts and commentators take the view that the law of the litigation forum governs, independent
of what the contract says.56 Thus, a specification in the contract that the law of [state X] governs
is irrelevant for matters of validity regardless of whether the additional word is used. To be sure,
some courts do suggest that the choice-of-law provisions can govern some matters of validity as
well. This issue appears to arise in contexts where the parties are disputing the validity of
specific aspects of the contract (such as whether a guarantee was validly authorized by a board of
directors).57 Here, the contractually chosen governing law is used to determine the outcome. But
the outcome in these latter cases is not determined by whether the governing law clause
explicitly mentions that it covers matters of validity. So, under either perspective, specifying that
determinations of the contract’s validity will be under the governing law of [state X] is a further
encrustation.
******
In the next Part, we analyze our data on the foregoing variations to the standard
governing law clause, comparing the rates of innovation and encrustation across four distinct
practice settings. In all of the contexts discussed above, whether deleting a costly encrustation or

56

See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2001, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 21 (2002)
(identifying “ existence, validity, scope, and enforceability” as “ the four sequential logical steps that a court takes
before applying the law chosen by the clause” ); Michael Gruson, Governing-Law Clause in International and
Interstate Loan Agreements—New York’s Approach, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 207, 223 (1982) (“ The parties to a
contract cannot change this conflict-of-laws rule relating to the validity of governing-law clauses.” ); John F. Coyle
& Christopher R. Drahozal, An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution Clauses in International Supply Contracts, 52
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 323 (2019) (“ [I]t is unclear whether the parties may choose the law that will determine
questions of a contract’s validity—most courts have held that this question will always be determined by forum
law.” ).
57

See IRB-Brasil Resseguros v. Inepar Investments, 982 N.E.2d 609, 609-612 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2012).
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inserting a beneficial innovation, interviews with market participants suggest that no
counterparty would have objected to the changes on substantive grounds. For drafting lawyers
aware of the respective costs and benefits of changing the clause, the costs of adding or
subtracting words are solely the minimal transaction cost of editing the document. The four
different contractual settings where we examine drafting responses to case law developments
permits us to better understand how differences in agency costs affect the drafting process.
III.

TESTING AGENCY COST INFLUENCE ON RESPONSES TO LEGAL SHOCKS

A. The Dataset
We collected information from Perfect Information and Westlaw’s What’s Market
database on the governing law clause for the four types of deals. We focused only on deals
governed by a U.S. law jurisdictions. For the sovereign, low yield, and high yield deals, the U.S.
jurisdiction was invariably New York. Most of the private equity deals chose Delaware law, but
a small fraction used other jurisdictions including New York. Given that the drafting advice in
the practitioner literature invariably applies to contracts used in all U.S. jurisdictions, we treat
contracts drafted under different U.S. jurisdictions as the same for purposes of our analysis.58
We collected data on deals from 2010 to early 2020. We started our dataset in 2010
because Westlaw’s What’s Market database does not have data on private equity M&A deals
available prior to 2010. For each deal type, we collected information on approximately 25 to 30
deals in each year, where available, selected at random. Some years had less than 25 total
observations due to a lack of available deals. In some cases, multiple observations selected at
random were for the same deal name and date and we deleted the duplicate observations. Table 1
details the number of deals for each deal type by year.

58

For our private equity deals, 48.8% of the deals in our dataset chose Delaware law; 26.1% chose New York law.
We compared the mean incidence of the different terms we study for Delaware versus New York law governed
private equity deals. Unreported, none of the differences in mean incidence for the terms for Delaware versus New
York was significantly different from zero.
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Table 1
Private

Low

High

Year

Equity

Sovereign

Yield

Yield

Total

2010

26

21

25

24

96

2011

27

23

26

22

98

2012

27

23

24

31

105

2013

26

23

24

26

99

2014

28

21

24

25

98

2015

26

18

24

24

92

2016

25

20

25

27

97

2017

25

22

31

26

104

2018

27

18

25

27

97

2019

27

26

25

26

104

2020

26

9

19

14

68

Total

290

224

272

272

1,058

B. Hypothesis: Private Equity Lawyers Will Add Terms but May Not Delete Any
We test whether contracts in private equity deals with lower agency costs have more
additional terms in the governing law clause compared with other deals. We expect private
equity deals to have more terms at the beginning of our dataset period than other deals: a greater
attention to drafting and a disposition to modify the governing law clause would result in the
accumulation of changes over the years prior to our dataset. This would be so if drafting lawyers
in general pursue the verbatim copying model referenced above which implies a preference for
addition rather than deletion whenever a clause is revised. Consistent with that model, we expect
the lawyers in private equity deals to be more responsive than lawyers in the other deals to the
caselaw and related events that should have motivated a revision in the governing law clause, but
the nature of that response may not be consistent.
For the legal shock that would motivate faithful agents to innovate by adding the noncontractual term to the governing law clause, we expect an increase in these terms for private
equity deals relative to other deals. The legal changes affecting the utility of the non-contractual
25
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term were the most salient events during our dataset time period, stemming from the fact that
there were many more articles and cases addressing this matter than any other aspect of the
governing law clause.59 Based on the analysis above, we conjecture that private equity lawyers
seeking to add a non-contractual term to the governing law clause in response to the extensive
articles and case law will likely not draft a new term from scratch but instead will copy the term
verbatim from an older contract or a commercially available model form.60 Lawyers using this
drafting strategy will not only copy the non-contractual term but also other language from the
model contract potentially including the conflicts of law term, leading both terms to migrate into
the governing law clause.61
C.

The Non-Contractual Term
We start with a comparison of the non-contractual term for our four types of deals. A

series of events affected the market’s view of the non-contractual term over the period of our
study. Our hypothesis is that the lawyers drafting private equity deals, having lower agency
costs, will be the most responsive to the events (both before and during our dataset time period)
that highlighted the value of adding the non-contractual term to the governing law clause. As
discussed above, the West/Lewis and Geller articles in 2009 first noted the value of adding a

59

See materials cited in notes 28 and 31, supra.

60

A recent development in contract drafting has been the emergence of commercial entities that market widely used
formulations of standard contract terms. While their algorithm is not publicly available, the selection of “ best
practice” seems to turn on the extent to which particular language is widely used in the market rather than on a
scholarly analysis of the formulation that would convey the best possible meaning for the contracting parties. One
version of such a program is Draft Analyzer on Bloomberg Law. Bloomberg’s description of what the program does
is as follows:
Draft Analyzer uses an algorithm to show you the developing consensus among drafters based on its
analysis of each paragraph from virtually every agreement and organizational document filed as an
EDGAR exhibit. Our system first categorizes each paragraph based on textual similarity and constructs one
or more unified versions (“ composites” ) for each identified cluster of similarly worded paragraphs. A
composite reflects the most common language in its underlying source documents.
https://help.bloomberglaw.com/docs/blh-050-corporate-and-transactional.html#practical-guidance
61

On the dysfunctionalities that lead to “ kitchen sink” drafting based on precedents, see Chris Lemens & Ken
Adams, Fixing Your Contracts: What Training in Contract Drafting Can and Can’t Do, DOCKET (Sept. 22, 2015),
https://www.accdocket.com/articles/fixing-your-contracts.cfm ; Ken Adams, Force Majeure in the Time of
Coronavirus: The Underlying Concepts and How to Express Them Clearly, ADAMS ON CONTRACT DRAFTING
(March 24, 2020), https://www.adamsdrafting.com/force-majeure-in-the-time-of-coronavirus/

26

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3653463

Draft Date: July 18, 2020

non-contractual term, followed by the Fishman/Freyre article in 2013, the Reid case in 2017 and
articles and blog posts by West, Coyle and others in 2017, 2018 and 2019.
Figure 1 depicts the yearly fraction of deals with the non-contractual term for each deal
type. Note that the graphs indicate a higher initial incidence for the non-contractual term in
private equity deals compared with the other deals. This higher incidence is consistent with
greater attention in private equity deals to the non-contractual term prior to our dataset period.

Looking at the change over time for the non-contractual term, a substantial increase in the
incidence of the term in private equity deals occurs over our sample time period. Only 15% of
private equity deals in 2010 had a non-contractual term compared with 50% in 2020. This
change is consistent with lower agency costs in private equity deals leading to greater
responsiveness to an exogenous legal shock in contract drafting.
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In comparison, the other three types of deals start with a lower fraction of clauses
containing the non-contractual term at the beginning of our sample period. In the case of
sovereign deals, only 10% of the deals have the non-contractual term in 2010. Only 4% of high
yield and 0% of low yield deals have the non-contractual term in 2010. The lower initial
incidence of the non-contractual term for the other types of deals compared with private equity
deals is consistent with a greater willingness on the part of contracting parties and their attorneys
in private equity deals to modify the governing clause prior to the start of our dataset time period,
possibly in response to the 2009 West and Lewis Business Lawyer article.
The fraction of deals with the non-contractual term in the other three types of deals does
not increase appreciably (if at all) from 2010 to 2020. For both sovereign and high yield deals,
0% of the deals in 2020 have the non-contractual term. Only 5% of the deals for low yield bond
issuances have the non-contractual term. The legal change affecting the market’s view of the
non-contractual term should have increased the motivation of parties and their attorneys in all
deal types to add the non-contractual term. Note, however, that while the decrease is statistically
significant for the low yield deals, the magnitude is not large compared with the increase in the
incidence of the non-contractual term for the private equity deals. The vast majority of nonprivate equity deals across our entire dataset period simply continued to omit the non-contractual
term altogether. The lack of any increase in the non-contractual term in these deals is consistent
with the hypothesis that the absence of effective monitoring of the drafting efforts of lawyers for
such deals leads to greater agency costs. As a consequence, the drafting attorneys continued their
prior practices across our dataset period without regard to the legal events that increased the
economic value of adding the non-contractual term.
D.

Multivariate Analysis
In our multivariate test, we estimate a linear probability model for the probability of a

non-contractual term in the governing law clause for a deal. The model is as follows.
Prob(Non-Contractuali) = α + ß1ln(Deal Amount)
+ ß2Private Equityi + Year Effects + εi
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For independent variables we include a control for the log of the deal amount (ln(Deal
Amount). It is possible that parties and their lawyers will invest more effort in drafting the
contract for larger deals. We include an indicator variable for a private equity deal (Private
Equity), comparing private equity deals against the other three types of deals in our dataset. As
discussed above, we did not observe appreciable differences between the three other deal types.
Accordingly, we compare private equity deals against the three other types combined. We
include year fixed effects. We estimate the model using ordinary least squares with errors
clustered by the issuer, or in the case of an acquisition, the acquirer. Model 1 of Table 2 reports
the results of the model.
To test the impact of the events that affected the salience of the non-contractual term, we
add to Model 1 an indicator variable for the period from 2013 to 2020 (2013 Onward). The base
category is the pre-2013 period from 2010 to 2012. As we discuss above, there are multiple
events that affected the market’s perception of the value of the non-contractual term that we use
collectively as the “shock” affecting the market’s perception of the non-contractual term.
Immediately before the start of our dataset (2009), Glenn West, Benton Lewis and Mitchell
Geller published two articles in leading practitioner journals on the ex ante value of the utilizing
the non-contractual term. That was followed by a third article in 2013 in a practitioner journal by
Eric Fishman and Amanda Fryre. We select 2013 as the first year during our dataset time period
when there is explicit practitioner attention, in the form of the Fishman and Fryre article, on the
non-contractual term. As we found in our prior research, the collective attention of practitioners,
rather than court cases, is important in initiating a change in boilerplate contract terms like the
governing law clause.62 In part, we suspect that this is so because transactional lawyers do not
devote a great deal of time keeping up with the case law.63 But it also may be because they are

62

Choi et al., Black Holes, supra note 1.

63

In explaining to us the reasons why, in his experience, transactional lawyers do not quickly respond to the case
law and revise their governing law clauses, one of the four reasons Professor Coyle gave was:
[Transactional] lawyers as a general rule don't read cases or go to court. This means that the people
drafting choice-of-law clauses are unlikely to come across published decisions that could inform their
drafting choices.
Email From John F. Coyle, July 12 (2020) (on file with authors).
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waiting for a signal that the collective is ready to move to a new term; a signal that they would
receive when multiple articles by leading practitioners are published in the foremost practitioner
journals around the same time.64
It is possible that practitioners had already started shifting toward using the non-contractual term
in response to the 2009 articles—because we were unable to collect data on private equity M&A
deals prior to 2010 we are unable to test for this. Our test examines whether the cumulative effect
of the 2009 articles and then the 2013 Fishman and Frye article initiated a shift in the market
toward the non-contractual term that cumulated with the Reid case in 2017 and additional articles
and blog posts by practitioners in 2017, 2018 and 2019. We also add to Model 1 an interaction
term between Private Equity and 2013 onward to assess whether a higher incidence of noncontractual terms correspond with private equity deals in the post 2013 period. Model 2 of Table
2 reports the results of the model.
Table 2: Linear Probability Model for Non-Contractual

ln(Deal Amount)
Private Equity

Model 1
NonContractual
0.0324**
(3.86)

Model 2
NonContractual
0.0291**
(3.54)

0.356**
(11.07)

0.181**
(3.78)

2013 Onward

0.0221
(0.47)

Private Equity
x 2013 Onward

0.238**
(4.37)

Constant

-0.667**
-0.552**
(-3.81)
(-3.21)
Year Effects
Yes
Yes
N
1008
1008
adj. R2
0.237
0.260
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Note from Model 1 of Table 2 that the coefficient on Private Equity is positive and
significant at the 1% level. Compared with the three other deal types, private equity deals
64

Scott et al., Revising Boilerplate, supra note 8.
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correspond to a 35.6 percentage point increased probability of a non-contractual term in the
governing law clause. This is consistent with lower agency costs in private equity deals leading
to a greater usage of the non-contractual term.
Model 2 addresses whether private equity deals are more responsive to the multiple
events affecting the non-contractual term. Note from Model 2 of Table 2 that the coefficient on
Private Equity is positive and significant at the 1% level. Private equity deals in the pre-2013
period corresponded with a 18.1 percentage point increase in the probability of a non-contractual
term compared with the other deal types. The coefficient on Private Equity x 2013 Onward is
positive and significant at the 1% level and the sum of 2013 Onward and Private Equity x 2013
Onward is positive and significant at the 1% level. The difference in the probability of a noncontractual term between private equity and non-private equity deals increased in the 2013
Onward period by 23.8 percentage points. This relative increase in the probability of a noncontractual term for private equity deals is consistent with lower agency costs (i.e., increased
monitoring) and thus a greater responsiveness by lawyers to the signals of legal change involving
the non-contractual term in our study time period.65
We focus on 2013 as the year that the series of practitioner articles from 2009 and 2013
culmulated to form a focal point for coordination. As we discuss above, it is possible that the
Reid case and articles and blog posts in 2017, 2018, and 2019 may have added pressure for
change. To test this possibility, we add an indicator variable for the 2017 to 2020 period (2017
Onward) to Model 2 of Table 2. We also add an interaction between Private Equity and 2017
Onward. Unreported, we obtain the same qualitative results as in Model 2 of Table 2. The
coefficient on Private Equity x 2013 Onward is positive and significant at the 1% level and the
sum of 2013 Onward and Private Equity x 2013 Onward is positive and significant at the 5%
level. In addition, the coefficient on 2017 Onward is not significantly different from zero,
consistent with no shift for the non-Private Equity deals in the 2017 Onward period. The
coefficient on Private Equity x 2017 Onward and the sum of 2017 Onward and Private Equity x
2017 Onward are positive and significant at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. Evidence exists

65

We re-estimated the models in Table 2 with a logistic regression model. Unreported, we obtained the same
qualitative results as in Table 2.

31

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3653463

Draft Date: July 18, 2020

that the use of the Non-Contractual term in private equity deals increased not only from 2013
onward but also, incrementally, from 2017 onward. The difference in the probability of a noncontractual term between private equity and non-private equity deals increased in the 2017
Onward period by 15.0 percentage points.
As another robustness test, we divide our dataset between the 2010 to 2014 period (pre
2015 period) and the 2015 to early 2020 period (2015 Onward), roughly splitting our dataset in
half. If there is a cumulative and increasing effect from the events over the period of our study,
then we expect the incidence of the non-contractual term to be higher in the 2015 Onward period
compared with the pre 2015 period. We re-estimate Model 2 of Table 2 substituting 2015
Onward for 2013 Onward. Unreported, we find a similar increase in the use of the noncontractual term PE deals in the 2015 Onward period as in Model 2. The coefficient on Private
Equity x 2015 Onward is positive and significant at the 1% level and the sum of 2015 Onward
and Private Equity x 2015 Onward is positive and significant at the 1% level. The difference in
the probability of a non-contractual term between private equity and non-private equity deals
increased in the 2015 Onward period by 24.7 percentage points.
IV. ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE AGENCY COSTS STORY
A.

An Analysis of the Number of Words
Our next test looks at the number of words in the governing law clause as a measure of

the overall complexity of the clause. Complexity in turn corresponds to the cumulative amount
of attention attorneys have spent on a clause. Our hypothesis is that attorneys who are attentive
to making changes are more likely to add language to a clause than remove it. Past usage is
continued because lawyers see no reason to eliminate a term they view as costless and thus incur
a risk, however small, of jeopardizing the market's standard meaning of their agreement. That
dynamic should then result in the growth of the clause over time. Put differently, the length of a
clause in words provides us with a measure of how often the clause has been modified, much like
rings on a tree measure the lifespan of the tree. Looking at the number of words in the governing
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law clause across different categories of deals, therefore, can identify which types of deals
involve the most active changes to the contract clause as well as when these changes occur.
Figure 2 depicts the number of words for the governing law clause for our four deal types
by year.

Note from Figure 2 that the mean number of words in the governing law clause in private
equity deals is significantly higher than for the other deal types. The difference between the
mean number of words for private equity deals (308) and the other deal types (115) is significant
at the 1% level. Focusing on private equity deals, we observe a significant shift in the number of
words in the pre-2013 period (258) to the 2013 Onward period (327) (difference significant at
the 1% level). The series of events involving the non-contractual term correspond to an increase
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in the number of words in the governing law clause for private equity deals, consistent with
greater complexity and attention paid to these clauses over our study time period.
As a multivariate test, we estimate an ordinary least squares model for the number of
words (Number of Words) in the governing law clause for a particular deal. The model is as
follows.
Number of Wordsi = α + ß1ln(Deal Amounti)
+ ß2Private Equityi + Year Effects + εi
For independent variables we include a control for the log of the deal amount (ln(Deal
Amount)). It is possible that parties and attorneys will invest more effort in drafting the contract
for larger deals. We include an indicator variable for a private equity deal (Private Equity),
comparing private equity deals against the other three types of deals in our dataset. We include
year fixed effects. We estimate the model using ordinary least squares with errors clustered by
the issuer, or in the case of an acquisition, the acquirer. Model 1 of Table 3 reports the results of
the model.
To test the impact of the multiple events that affected the salience of the non-contractual
term, we add to Model 1 an indicator variable for 2013 Onward. The base category is the pre2013 period. We also add to Model 1 an interaction term between Private Equity and 2013
Onward to assess whether the number of words increased in the 2013 Onward period for private
equity deals relative to the other deal types. Model 2 of Table 3 reports the results of the model.
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Table 3: Number of Words

ln(Deal Amount)
Private Equity

Model 1
Number of
Words
18.00**
(4.47)

Model 2
Number of
Words
17.17**
(4.21)

212.0**
(19.09)

167.3**
(11.27)

2013 Onward

33.85
(1.62)

Private Equity
x 2013 Onward

60.58**
(3.27)

Constant

-264.4**
-235.1**
(-3.29)
(-2.89)
Year Effects
Yes
Yes
N
1011
1011
adj. R2
0.421
0.428
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Note from Model 1 of Table 3 that the coefficient on Private Equity is positive and
significant at the 1% level. Compared with the three other deal types, private equity deals
correspond to 212 more words in the governing law clause compared with the other deal types.
Lower agency costs in private equity deals correspond with greater overall number of words in the
governing law clause.
Note from Model 2 of Table 3 that the coefficient for Private Equity is positive and
significant at the 1% level. Private equity deals in the pre-2013 period correspond to 167.3 more
words in the governing law clause compared with other deals. This is consistent with lower
agency costs for private equity deals leading to a greater overall level of complexity in the
governing law clause—indicating greater cumulative attention by the attorneys in such deals.
The coefficient on the interaction between Private Equity x 2013 Onward is also positive and
significant at the 1% level, corresponding with a greater increase 60.6 more words) in the 2013
Onward period for Private Equity compared with the other deal types. The sum of 2013 Onward
and Private Equity x 2013 Onward is also positive and significant at the 1% level. This is
consistent with greater attorney attention in private equity deals following the non-Contractual
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term legal events affecting the overall length of the governing law clause, indicating increased
contract drafting activity on the clause.
To test this possibility that the Reid case and articles and blog posts in 2017, 2018, and
2019 may have added pressure for change, we add an indicator variable for the 2017 to 2020
period (2017 Onward) to Model 2 of Table 3. We also add an interaction between Private Equity
and 2017 Onward. Unreported, we obtain the same qualitative results as in Model 2 of Table 3.
The coefficient on Private Equity x 2013 Onward is positive and significant at the 5% level and
the sum of 2013 Onward and Private Equity x 2013 Onward is positive and significant at the 5%
level. In addition, the coefficient on 2017 Onward is not significantly different from zero,
consistent with no shift for the non-Private Equity deals in the 2017 Onward period. Neither the
coefficient on Private Equity x 2017 Onward nor the sum of 2017 Onward and Private Equity x
2017 Onward are significantly different from zero. We do not find evidence that the number of
words in the governing law clause increased incrementally for private equity deals from 2017
onward.
As another robustness test, we divide our dataset between the 2010 to 2014 period (pre
2015 period) and the 2015 to early 2020 period (2015 Onward). We expect the number of words
in the governing law clause to be higher in the 2015 Onward period compared with the pre 2015
period for private equity deals if attorneys paid more attention to the governing law clause in
response to the events related to the non-contractual clause. We re-estimate Model 2 of Table 3
substituting 2015 Onward for 2013 Onward. Unreported, we find a similar increase in the
number of words in the governing law clause for PE deals in the 2015 Onward period as in
Model 2. The coefficient on the interaction between Private Equity x 2015 Onward is also
positive and significant at the 1% level, corresponding with a greater increase 77.9 more words)
in the 2015 Onward period for Private Equity compared with the other deal types. The sum of
2015 Onward and Private Equity x 2015 Onward is also positive and significant at the 1% level.
B.

Analysis of Encrustations
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The governing law clauses in our dataset contain encrustations that were not affected by
any legal change during our study period. These include terms that use phrases that refer to
“construed”, “interpreted”, “conflicts of law”, “choice of law”, “internal domestic”,
“substantive”, “made and performed”, “executed” and “validity”. To get a sense of the total
amount of encrustations in the governing law clause, we count the number of encrustations in the
governing law clause for each deal in our dataset (termed “Other Encrustations”).
We test the two opposing hypotheses on how lower agency costs affect the rate of
encrustations. First, lower agency costs may lead to fewer encrustations as those lawyers charged
with drafting contracts and who are more carefully scrutinized by their clients remove redundant
and costly encrustations over time. Second, by their very nature encrustations appear as
innocuous additions to a clause at least at the time they are first introduced into the legal
marketplace. Lower agency costs may not only lead to a greater propensity for contracts to adopt
value-increasing terms but also to a greater motivation to further modify the contract, leading to
spillover encrustations. An attorney using the verbatim copying strategy to revise a contract in
order to add value-enhancing terms will first look for examples of standard formulations of the
new term found in forms supplied by commercial entities as well as in precedents found in older
contracts. The cut-and-paste process that follows this search for the best formulation may cause
encrustations in the sample versions of the clause to be added to the contract along with the new
value-increasing term. Under this second hypothesis, lower agency costs correspond to a greater
frequency in the reproduction of pre-existing templates and thus they also can lead to more
encrustations.
Figure 3 depicts the number of encrustations for each deal type in our dataset by year.
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Note from Figure 3 that the overall level of encrustations for Private Equity is roughly
twice as high as that for other deal types. The difference between the mean number of
encrustations for Private Equity (2.7) and the other types (1.0) is significant at the 1% level.
Focusing on private equity deals, we observe a shift in the number of encrustations in the pre2013 period (2.5) to the 2013 Onward (2.8) period (significant at the 5% level).
As a multivariate test, we estimate an ordinary least squares model for the number of
encrustations in the governing law clause for a particular deal. The model is as follows.
Number of Encrustationsi = α + ß1ln(Deal Amounti)
+ ß2Private Equityi + Year Effects + εi
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For independent variables we include a control for the log of the deal amount (ln(Deal
Amount)). We include an indicator variable for a Private Equity deal (Private Equity), comparing
private equity deals against the other three types of deals in our dataset. We include year fixed
effects. We estimate the model using ordinary least squares with errors clustered by the issuer, or
in the case of an acquisition, the acquirer. Model 1 of Table 4 reports the results of the model.
As discussed above, it is possible that legal events that affect one term may result in
spillover impact on other terms, including encrustations in particular. Spillover can occur
through direct edits or, more likely, through verbatim copying of language from other deal
documents that allow unrelated encrustations to travel along with desired language. To test
whether there is a spillover effect for encrustations from the cumulative events that affected the
non-contractual term, we add to Model 1 an indicator variable for 2013 Onward. The base
category is the pre-2013 period. We also add to Model 1 an interaction term between Private
Equity and 2013 Onward to assess whether the number of words increased in the 2013 Onward
period for private equity deals relative to the other deal types. Model 2 of Table 4 reports the
results of the model.
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Table 4: Number of Encrustations

ln(Deal Amount)
Private Equity

Model 1
Number of
Encrustations
-0.0217
(-0.78)

Model 2
Number of
Encrustations
-0.0264
(-0.96)

1.620**
(20.56)

1.376**
(10.53)

2013 Onward

0.122
(0.95)

Private Equity
x 2013 Onward

0.334*
(2.28)

1.325*
(2.43)
Year Effects
Yes
N
966
adj. R2
0.512
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Constant

1.486**
(2.74)
Yes
966
0.516

Note from Model 1 of Table 4 that the coefficient on Private Equity is positive and
significant at the 1% level. Compared with the three other deal types, private equity deals
correspond to 1.62 more encrustations compared with the other deal types. Lower agency costs
in private equity deals correspond with greater encrustations in the governing law clause.
Note from Model 2 of Table 4 that the coefficient for Private Equity is positive and
significant at the 1% level. Private equity deals in the pre-2013 period correspond to 1.38 more
other encrustations compared with other deals. This is consistent with lower agency costs for
private equity deals leading to a greater overall level of encrustations. The coefficient on 2013
Onward is positive but not significant. We find no evidence that there is an increase in
encrustations for the non-PE deal types in the 2013 Onward period. Lastly, the coefficient on the
interaction between Private Equity x 2013 Onward is positive and significant at the 5% level.
The sum of 2013 Onward + Private Equity x 2013 Onward is also positive and significant at the
1% level. Unlike for non-PE deals, PE deals corresponded with an increase in encrustations in
the 2013 Onward period. This is consistent with the spillover hypothesis.
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To test this possibility that the Reid case and articles and blog posts in 2017, 2018, and
2019 may have added pressure for change, we add an indicator variable for the 2017 to 2020
period (2017 Onward) to Model 2 of Table 4. We also add an interaction between Private Equity
and 2017 Onward. Unreported, we obtain the same qualitative results as in Model 2 of Table 4.
The coefficient on Private Equity x 2013 Onward is positive and significant at the 5% level and
the sum of 2013 Onward and Private Equity x 2013 Onward is positive and significant at the 1%
level. In addition, the coefficient on 2017 Onward is not significantly different from zero,
consistent with no shift for the non-Private Equity deals in the 2017 Onward period. Neither the
coefficient on Private Equity x 2017 Onward nor the sum of 2017 Onward and Private Equity x
2017 Onward are significantly different from zero. We do not find evidence that the number of
encrustations in private equity deals increased incrementally from 2017 onward.
As another robustness test, we divide our dataset between the 2010 to 2014 period (pre
2015 period) and the 2015 to early 2020 period (2015 Onward). We expect the number of
encrustations in the governing law clause to be higher in the 2015 Onward period compared with
the pre 2015 period for private equity deals if attorneys made greater spillover changes to the
governing law clause in response to the cumulative events related to the non-contractual clause.
We re-estimate Model 2 of Table 4 substituting 2015 Onward for 2013 Onward. Unreported, we
find a similar increase in the number of encrustations for PE deals in the 2015 Onward period as
in Model 2. The coefficient on 2015 Onward is positive but not significant. We find no evidence
that there is an increase in encrustations for the non-PE deal types in the 2015 Onward period.
The coefficient on the interaction between Private Equity x 2015 Onward is positive and
significant at the 5% level. The sum of 2015 Onward + Private Equity x 2015 Onward is also
positive and significant at the 1% level.
V. TOP PRIVATE EQUITY FIRM TESTS
Our tests above are cross-sectional and involve a variety of transacting parties including
public companies, private companies, private equity funds, and sovereigns. A strength of our
data is that it allows a comparison of transactions involving contexts with relatively higher
agency costs (sovereign debt offerings) versus lower agency costs (private equity deals). A
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weakness of our data is the possibility that unobserved factors may affect variations in the
governing law clause that then bias our tests.
As an alternative to our cross-sectional data, we identify the top fifteen private equity
(PE) firms based on a ranking in 2020 by Private Equity International and collect all of the deals
in which these top fifteen PE firms are participants from 2010 to 2020.66 We use this panel data
to assess the impact of the events affecting the non-contractual term solely for these PE firms in
private equity deals. We estimate the following OLS linear probability model using the presence
of a Non-Contractual term as the dependent variable:
Non-Contractuali = α + ß1ln(Deal Amounti)
+ ß22013 Onwardi + PE Firm Fixed Effects + εi
The model includes the log of the deal amount and an indicator variable for 2015 Onward
as independent variables. We use 2013 Onward as a proxy for the time period when the events
affecting the non-contractual term will have a greater effect on the use of the non-contractual
term relative to the period prior to 2013. 2013 Onward allows to us assess whether for the same
PE firm, deals in 2013 onward are more likely to contain a non-contractual term. We estimate the
model with PE firm fixed effects and cluster the errors by PE firm. Model 1 of Table 5 reports
the results.

66

See Private Equity International 2020 Ranking available at https://www.privateequityinternational.com/pei-300/
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Table 5

ln(Deal Amount)
2013 Onward

Model 1
NonContractual
-0.00436
(-0.14)

Model 2
Number of
Words
8.990
(1.02)

Model 3
Number of
Encrustations
-0.0581
(-0.74)

0.488**
(3.97)

141.7**
(3.28)

0.526**
(4.91)

Constant

0.277
75.56
(0.44)
(0.42)
PE Firm Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
N
126
126
adj. R2
0.172
0.118
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

3.403+
(2.06)
Yes
126
0.036

Note from Model 1 of Table 5 that the coefficient on 2013 Onward is positive and
significant at the 1% level. For the same PE firm there is a 48.8 percentage point increase in the
likelihood of a non-contractual term in the governing law clause from 2013 onward compared
with prior to 2013. This result corroborates our finding above that from 2013 onward, there was
a significant increase in the use of the non-contractual term for PE deals compared with the other
types of deals.
To examine the impact of the events affecting the non-contractual term on the number of
words in the governing law clause, we estimate a regression model with the same independent
variables as in Model 1 of Table 5 and using the Number of Words as the dependent variable.
We report the results in Model 2 of Table 5. Note from Model 2 of Table 5 that the coefficient on
2013 Onward is positive and significant. The 2013 Onward period corresponds with governing
law clauses that are 141.7 words longer compared with the pre-2013 period. The greater number
of words in the 2013 Onward period indicates that PE firms and their attorney agents engaged in
greater contract drafting activity in the 2013 Onward period. This is consistent with the series of
non-contractual events increasing the amount of attention paid to the governing law clause.
Greater contract drafting activity may indicate that private equity firms are engaged in
“beneficial” changes to the contract by adding value-enhancing non-contractual terms to the
governing law clause. However, more contract drafting activity may also lead to spillover
changes that can have the off-setting effect of increasing encrustations. Encrustations have no
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economic value but by increasing the complexity and reducing the clarity of the contract's
language, they increase the risk of strategic litigation. During the time period of our study there
are no legal shocks affecting the incentives to revise the encrustations. Focusing on the
encrustations provides a more direct test of the impact of contract drafting spillovers on the
incidence of encrustations. To assess whether there was a spillover effect from 2013 onward, we
re-estimate Model 2 of Table 5 replacing the number of words with the number of encrustations
as the dependent variable. We report the results in Model 3 of Table 5.
Note from Model 3 of Table 5 that the coefficient on 2013 Onward is positive and
significant at the 1% level. In our private equity firm fixed effects model, the number of other
encrustations increased in the 2013 Onward period, consistent with a spillover effect from
increased contract activity leading to more encrustations.
To test this possibility that the Reid case and articles and blog posts in 2017, 2018, and
2019 may have added pressure for change, we add an indicator variable for the 2017 to 2020
period (2017 Onward) to the models of Table 5. Unreported, the coefficients on 2013 Onward
remained positive and statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. None
of the coefficients on 2017 Onward in contrast were significantly different from zero. While we
find evidence consistent with 2013 forming a focal point for change in the governing law clause,
we do not find evidence that the later events concerning the governing law clause in 2017, 2018,
and 2019 had an incremental effect above the 2009 and 2013 events.
As another robustness test, we divide our dataset between the 2010 to 2014 period (pre
2015 period) and the 2015 to early 2020 period (2015 Onward). We re-estimate the models of
Table 5 substituting 2015 Onward for 2013 Onward. Unreported, we find a similar effect as in
Table 5 from the cumulative impact of the events affecting the market’s perception of the noncontractual term when we divide our dataset time period roughly in half using 2015 Onward. The
coefficients on 2015 Onward are positive and significant at the 1% levels in the re-estimated
models.
VI. CONCLUSION
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Our prior work in sovereign debt contracting showed that a key source of agency costs
was the reluctance of agents—the bankers, debt managers, and most especially the lawyers—to
act unilaterally to revise boilerplate terms that were accepted as the standard form in a large
multilateral market. The current study has been designed to further advance our understanding of
the ways that agency costs influence the choices that lawyers face between innovation and
encrustation when changes in legal rules dictate revisions to standard contract language.
Two results stand out. The first is predictable: lawyers who draft private equity M&A
deals pay more attention to the deal terms than lawyers producing corporate and sovereign bond
contracts because the principals in the M&A/private equity market have more at stake and are
directly involved in the deals. Because agency costs are low in the private equity setting, we
observe more innovation in private equity deals as compared to sovereign and corporate bond
transactions where the agency problems of drafting lawyers are much greater.
The second result is surprising: contracts drafted by private equity lawyers have more
obsolete and encrusted terms than the contracts of the other deal types. This anomalous result
requires a rethinking of the different motivations of the two groups of lawyers. The bond
lawyers’ behavior is relatively easier to characterize. The study supports the hypothesis that bond
lawyers largely avoid any responsibility for superintending the terms in the contracts they
produce. There is virtually no “drafting” in any meaningful sense of that word. Rather, as two of
us have noted elsewhere, these are contracts produced on an assembly line, sometimes in as little
as three and a half minutes.67 The consequence of paying no attention to the terms of the contract
is that there are no innovations but there are also fewer of the encrustations that result from
efforts to modify existing language. This is not to say that the lawyers would not wish to modify
their contract provisions, if left to their own devices. But, as prior research has shown, the
pressure to retain language that conforms to the “market standard” and conforms to whatever
worked in the prior deal is significant.68

67
68

See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 14.
Choi et al., supra note 1; Gelpern et al., supra note 3.
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Private equity lawyers present a more complex picture. Our results suggest that they are
more motivated to respond to the need for legal change than their compatriots in the bond world.
But at the same time, the effort to revise existing language to improve contractual value appears
to have spillover effects: costly encrustations are imported as beneficial language is added. Our
conjecture is that what we observe in the data is the product of the dominant drafting strategy in
law firms, which is to look for models to copy rather than to draft language from scratch. That is,
lawyers try to find examples of the desired term elsewhere and import that language verbatim
into the contract together with other redundant and obsolete terms including, in the extreme case,
terms that are harmful to the client's interests if retained in the contract.69 Whether our conjecture
reflects the real world of contracting or whether the net result of this drafting strategy is an
increase in contractual value for their clients is a question that we hope to tackle in further work.

69

One explanation for the increase in encrustations might be that lawyers, while seeking to innovate, simultaneously
feel the need to be able to argue that they are using “market standard” language. Glenn West, in his comments on
our paper, suggested something along these lines. He also made an interesting point about drafting norms, noting:
[I]t is considered rude and a breach of negotiation etiquette to rewrite a party’s first draft even if it contains
encrustations—the idea is to fix encrustations that do harm, but to leave those that do no harm. And
sometimes the way to do that is by additions without deletions.
Emails from Glenn West (July 15, 2020) (on file with authors).
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